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POST-AMENDMENT 80 JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARKANSAS: HAVE




As one Arkansas Bar Association leader argued in promoting the suc-
cessful campaign for Amendment 80, the amendment "kind of brings the
courts into the 20th century."' Ratified by the people in the final days of that
century, the modernizing effects of Amendment 80 are seen most clearly in
its significant overhaul to the structure of the state's court system. z But the
advocates of Amendment 80 reforms also argued that a shift away from
partisan elections for almost all judges in the state would also modernize the
courts by lessening the public perception that judgeships are overtly "politi-
cal" offices. As we move towards the fourth election cycle for judges since
the passage of Amendment 80, it is now time to begin to ask whether the
alteration in the selection process for judges has created real reform that
undermines the argument for judicial selection by appointment, or if the
alteration has only marginally altered the rules of the same electoral game.
II. THE ELECTIVE SYSTEM FOR ARKANSAS JUDGES
A. Origin of Arkansas's Elective System
Although Arkansas judges were originally appointed-first by the leg-
islature, later by the governor-by 1864 Arkansas had opted for popular
election, a method modified during Reconstruction years but resoundingly
reconfirmed in the 1874 constitution and sustained since. In a slight temper-
ing of the Jacksonian spirit, elective terms for some judges are lengthier than
* Jay Barth is M. E. and Ima Graves Peace Distinguished Professor of politics and
director of civic engagement projects at Hendrix College in Conway, Arkansas. This essay is
an update and expansion of a portion of Chapter 10 of DIANE D. BLAIR & JAY BARTH,
ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: Do THE PEOPLE RULE? (University of Nebraska Press
2d ed., 2005).
1. Mark Waller, Combine Courts, Jurists Propose, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, March
15, 1990, at BI (quoting Sidney McCollum, co-chair of the Arkansas Bar Association's
committee on the amendment).
2. For an overview of these changes to the state's judicial system, see DIANE D. BLAIR
& JAY BARTH, ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: Do THE PEOPLE RULE? 225-35 (Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press 2d ed., 2005).
UALR LAW REVIEW
those of most other elected officials: eight years for supreme court and court
of appeals justices; six years for circuit judges; and four years for district
judges. Unlike many other states, however, where the trend in recent dec-
ades has been toward "merit selection, '3 the Amendment 80 reform retained
a totally elected judiciary. Amendment 80, however, significantly altered the
election process. Rather than the partisan elections of the past (with judges
having to obtain a party nomination before moving on to the general elec-
tion), all judges now run in a nonpartisan election at the time of the party
primaries. If no candidate receives a majority of the vote at that time, then
the top two finishers face off months later in the November general election.
Indeed, according to one analysis, Arkansas has the most elected state
judiciary in the nation-i.e., the highest percentage of judges who first reach
the bench through election rather than appointment. Although twenty-two
states still elect most of their judges (seven in partisan elections, fifteen in
nonpartisan elections), in many of these states political custom promotes the
practice of judges resigning shortly before their terms expire. The governor,
therefore, may appoint a successor, who then runs for re-election with all the
advantages of incumbency. Indeed, a majority of elective judges around the
country initially reached the bench through gubernatorial selection rather
than through the "normal" process of election.4
What makes this ruse impossible in Arkansas is a constitutional
amendment prohibiting a judicial appointee from running for election for
that office to which he or she was appointed. Only one other state has such a
prohibition. Amendment 29 to the Arkansas Constitution, proposed by
popular initiative and adopted by fifty-two percent of the voters in 1938,
contains several provisions designed to prevent a variety of political abuses
that had become commonplace and was not aimed exclusively, or even pri-
marily, at the judicial branch. Still, because it clearly prohibits any person
appointed to the United States Senate or to any "elective state, district, cir-
cuit, county and township office" from being eligible "to appointment or
election to succeed himself."5 As a result, Arkansas has the most "democrat-
3. The most common merit system employed by other states is a gubernatorial ap-
pointment chosen from a list recommended by a judicial selection committee, followed by a
"retention" election.
4. On the percentages of elected judges, see JOHN PAUL RYAN, ALLAN ASHMAN, BRUCE
D. SALES, & SANDRA SHANE-DuBow, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES 122 (1980). For judicial
selection methods in the fifty states, see Melinda Gann Hall, State Courts: Politics and the
Judicial Process, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 229-55 (Virginia Gray & Russell L.
Hanson eds.) 9th Ed. (2008). On the appointment of "elective" judges, see Henry R. Glick,
Courts: Politics and the Judicial Process, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 232-66
(Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson, & Herbert Jacob eds.) 7th Ed. (1999).
5. ARK. CONST. amend. 29, § 2.
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ic" judiciary of any in the nation.6 Moreover, as discussed in the pages that
follow, the trend has been towards solidifying rather than undermining the
spirit of Amendment 29 in the new century.
B. The Rationale for an Elective Judiciary
The rationale for an elective judiciary is anchored in arguments that it
offers more popular and participatory process than the allegedly more
closed, secretive, and elitist appointive method. Because judges make deci-
sions with profound consequences for citizens' well-being, the argument
follows that citizens should be capable of selecting judges who are sensitive
to popular preferences and values. Furthermore, elections make it possible
for citizens to hold judges accountable for the quality of their performance
and their fidelity to the public trust.
To begin with, although many open judicial seats produce a genuine
contest, many more draw only one "contestant," who is then "elected" by
acclamation. Elections to the court of appeals, for example, were held for
the first time in 1980; in only four of the six districts did more than one can-
didate file, and, for the twenty years between its creation and the end of the
century, there were only five other primary or general election challenges in
elections for the court despite the doubling of its size. Similarly, responses
to a survey of circuit and chancery judges in the mid-1980s indicated that
nearly half (twenty-eight of fifty-nine) were first "elected" to their position
without a contest.
7
This basic trend has continued after Amendment 80's implementation.
In 2002, seven of the twenty-five open judgeships were "won" without a
challenge.8 In 2004 and 2006, competitive races were more regular when
there was no incumbent candidate-there was electoral competition in eight
of the nine circuit court races without an incumbent during those two cycles.
When a position on the court of appeals opened in a northeast Arkansas dis-
trict in 2006, however, only one candidate filed for the position.
The chances of a contest are reduced even more dramatically when an
incumbent judge seeks reelection. It is extremely uncommon for a sitting
6. The most publicized provisions of Amendment 29 were those requiring an absolute
majority rather than a plurality for primary victory, those prohibiting the governor or his
relatives from assuming any vacated office, and those placing restrictions on nomination by
party convention. The Arkansas Bar Association was distressed by Governor Futrell's ap-
pointment of C. E. Johnson as chief justice and supported this amendment along with a 1937
law prohibiting judges from participating in any campaign other than their own.
7. On September 16, 1985, questionnaires were mailed to sixty-seven circuit and chan-
cery judges and fifty-nine responses were received. Questionnaires and tabulated responses,
hereafter cited as "Judicial Questionnaire," are in the author's possession.
8. Data calculated by author from election information maintained by Arkansas Secre-
tary of State Elections Division.
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judge to draw an opponent, and defeat of an incumbent judge is the rarest
occurrence in Arkansas politics. Incumbent supreme court justices were
defeated only three times in the twentieth century, all in highly unusual cir-
cumstances, and successful challenges are even more infrequent at lower
levels. From 1972 through 2000, fewer than ten general jurisdiction judges
lost their seats to challengers. The first election cycle of the nonpartisan
election era, 2002, both illustrates and reaffirms previous findings about the
political safety of incumbent judges: of the seventy-two sitting judges who
ran for re-election, only six faced challenges, and all six won solid victories.
Since that time, of the twenty-five sitting judges at the circuit and appellate
levels running for reelection, only two have been challenged (unsuccessful-
ly) -one supreme court justice and one circuit judge.9
This nearly routine reelection of most judges may well reflect popular
satisfaction with incumbents, but it also reflects the hesitancy of practicing
lawyers to challenge an incumbent judge. The chance of victory is slim, and
the penalty for a lawyer who must continue practicing in the court of a judge
he or she attempted to remove from the bench can be severe. Even support-
ing the losing candidate in a judicial contest is risky business for a lawyer.
As one attorney recently noted, "I've heard horror stories about judges who
win tacking their defeated opponent's ads up on the wall, and those who
signed it being on a 'hit list' [for unfavorable treatment]." As another lawyer
noted, "If you strike at the king, you must strike to kill.""0
Because the electorate is so likely to support the incumbent against a
challenger, judges seeking reelection always use "Judge" before their name
on the ballot and, in the rare event of challenge, emphasize their incumben-
cy in all advertisements: for example, "Circuit Judge Paul Jameson IS A
TRIAL JUDGE NOW. Keep a proven, working trial judge at work on the
job. Let the work of the court proceed without interruption. Re-elect Judge
Paul Jameson."" The insistent, almost frantic tone of this particular pitch
was due to the fact that the challenger in this instance, having served as an
appointed judge on the court of appeals, was also entitled to run with
9. The 1936, 1938, and 1958 defeats of incumbent supreme court justices are discussed
in CALVIN R. LEDBETTER, JR., THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT: 1958-59 (1961) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University). Other data was compiled by author from Ar-
kansas election returns. On the fierce judicial lobbying for advantageous apportionment
schemes, see George Bentley, Judicial Panel Recommends Rearrangement, ARK. GAZETrE,
Oct. 12, 1975, and Ernest Dumas, Redistricting Plan Dropped, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 23,
1976.
10. Anthony Moser, Lawyer Urges Judicial Reform in Wake of Traffic Judge Scam,
ARK. DEMOCRAT, Oct. 31, 1985 (quoting Raymond Abramson in James B. Blair classroom
lecture).
11. Judge Jameson's advertisement in Northwest Arkansas Times, May 25, 1980.
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"Judge" before his name on the ballot, thus creating potential confusion for
the electorate.12
Because polling research indicates that using "Judge" before a candi-
date's name is worth an automatic twenty percent of the votes, any candi-
dates who can legitimately attach this appellation do so and feature pictures
of their robed selves in all advertising. 3 It is certainly no accident that the
single office that circuit judges most frequently hold preceding their election
to the general jurisdiction bench is that of district judge. Furthermore, over
one-quarter of all elected district judges sitting in 2002 had received an ap-
pointment to a general jurisdiction judgeship prior to their first successful
race for the bench (with many others receiving other judicial appointments).
In addition, it has been common for an appellate court judge to gain a posi-
tion through appointment soon before an election and then run for an open
seat on the same court in that election, thus skirting the prohibitions in
Amendment 29. What this practice suggests is that even in Arkansas's
"purely elective" system, appointments have traditionally been extensively
parlayed into electoral success. 4
The rules related to pre-election appointments of this sort, however,
have changed since the passage of Amendment 80 in a way that will limit
the benefits of such appointments. A 2001 legislative action means that only
candidates who have been elected to a judgeship are able to use the title on
the ballot. They remain able to tout the experience (and their title) in their
campaigns. Because the research that has been done centers on the potency
of the word "Judge" on the ballot rather than a candidate's campaigning on
their having been a "judge," it is unclear at this writing how much bang this
more limited benefit is bringing appointed Arkansas judges as they run for
different positions.
A second attempt to limit the power of judicial appointment as a parlay
into election came in 2005, as the General Assembly passed a law that
would have barred those appointed as a judge from seeking a judgeship
within the same judicial division. Ultimately, an appointed circuit judge
seeking to run for another position successfully challenged the law, as the
state Supreme Court said that the alteration of the rules violated the clear
provisions of Amendment 29."5
12. Id.
13. Interestingly, Judge Berlin Jones of Pine Bluff did not run with this label when run-
ning for re-election in 2004.
14. See Ernest Dumas, The Strange World of Appellate Judgeship Elections, ARK.
GAZETTE, Apr. 22, 1984. Data on career paths of district judges collected by author from the
biographical data files maintained by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
15. See Rob Moritz, Bill on Judicial Elections Approved, ARK. NEWS BUREAU, Mar. 19,
2005; Rob Moritz, Supreme Court Asked to Uphold Circuit Court Ruling, ARK. NEWS
BUREAU, February 17, 2006.
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III. ISSUES IMPACTING THE ELECTIVE SYSTEM
A. Judicial Elections: Partisan or Not?
As was the case before Amendment 80, the utility of elections as an in-
strument of popular influence on the judiciary remains somewhat stifled by
the frequency with which only one candidate seeks the office, the infrequen-
cy with which incumbent judges are challenged, and the fact that many non-
incumbent candidates have presented themselves as incumbents to the elec-
torate by using "Judge" before their name on the ballot or in their cam-
paigns. Of course, when all candidates run as "Judge" (as in the three-man
race for the open associate supreme court justiceship in 2004) or when none
uses that label (as in the two-man race for an open associate supreme court
justiceship in 1998), the electorate must rely on other clues. What other fac-
tors enter into the judicial selection process, and do they enhance or further
weaken the "popular accountability" rationale for an elective judiciary?
As noted, until the passage of Amendment 80 all judicial contests in
Arkansas were partisan. Thus, most current judges in Arkansas were first
elected with a Democratic party label, and this likely will remain the case
through the first couple of decades of this century. Because studies demon-
strate that there are in fact measurable policy differences between Democrat-
ic and Republican state judges and that those differences are in the direction
that party affiliation might logically predict (that is, Democratic judges are
more likely to find for the tenant in landlord-tenant cases, for the employee
in employee injury cases, for the administrative agency in business regula-
tion cases, and so on), the party label might seem to have offered some use-
ful guidance to the electorate in these judges' initial elections. Such was not
the case in Arkansas through the era of partisan judicial elections. 6
Because of the Republican party's difficulty in fielding candidates and
because fielding judicial candidates was not the party's priority, Republican-
ism had not trickled down the ballot to judicial elections by the time of
Amendment 80's passage.' 7 In 2000, for instance, of twenty-one appellate
and general jurisdiction judgeships on the ballot, Republicans were able to
field candidates in only five of the races (and three of these were appellate
court judges whom Republican Governor Mike Huckabee had first ap-
pointed and who ran unsuccessfully against other "judges" for different ap-
pellate seats). Indeed, through the partisan election cycle of 2000, only six
Republicans sought a supreme court position in the twentieth century (the
16. See Stuart Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 843-51 (1961); Sidney Ulmer, The Political Party Variable on the Michigan Supreme
Court, 11 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 352-62 (1962).
17. In the late 1990s, the executive director of the GOP explained that "Most of the
Republican lawyers are just starting their practices."
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first being the same Jim Johnson who had run six times previously for office
as a Democrat and once as a candidate of the White Citizens Council, in
1984). At the general jurisdiction level, between 1990 and 2000 there were
only twenty-nine general election contests with Republican candidates,
compared with sixty-eight Democratic primary contests; the vast majority of
those GOP candidacies came when new judgeships were created and were
feeble efforts. Whatever clarifying utility the party label may have in a com-
petitive two-party state, in Arkansas almost all viable judicial contests that
took place before Amendment 80 were within the Democratic primary.
Since it was clear that "Democrats" would be elected to judgeships
whether elections were partisan or nonpartisan, why did the state Democrat-
ic party fight so ferociously in the legislature against nonpartisan elections
for judges? Although arguments about voters needing the information pro-
vided by party labels were voiced, these were undeniably window-dressing
for the real reason: dollars and cents. The dozens of Democratic judges who
filed each election cycle (most to simply return to their existing job) pro-
vided hundreds of thousands of dollars in filing fees to the party. Although
necessary to help offset the cost of party-run primaries after 1995 (when the
state took over all primary election administration), this became money that
could be used for party-building activities to the Democrats' advantage and
the state Republican party's disadvantage. Despite the majority party's suc-
cessful opposition in previous legislative sessions, nonpartisanship in judi-
cial elections-long advocated by judicial reformers in the state as shown by
its inclusion in rejected modem constitutions-was included in the draft of
Amendment 80 that voters approved. In addition, the Code of Judicial Con-
duct was altered after the amendment's passage to prohibit the use of party
endorsements in a race. Before the point in time when party labeling would
mean much in these elections, therefore, Amendment 80 removed this cue
from the ballot in Arkansas.
8
Although the partisan cue is gone from judicial elections in the state,
partisan dynamics still matter greatly in shaping judicial outcomes. The rea-
son for this importance is that the first round of voting occurs at the time of
the party primaries and all judicial elections are decided in this round unless
more than two candidates run for the seat. In Arkansas, May elections are
18. See Elizabeth Caldwell and Rachel O'Neal, Tucker Backs Move to Make Elections of
Judges Nonpartisan, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 1994; Elizabeth Caldwell, Vote
Keeps Judge Races Partisan, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE, Apr. 7, 1995; Elizabeth Caldwell
and Kevin Freking, Senate Defeats Bill Amid GOP Grumbles, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Jan. 29, 1997; David Robinson, Democratic Party Pledges Fight Against Nonpartisan Judi-
cial Elections, THE MORNING NEWS OF NORTHWEST ARKANSAS, Jan. 14, 1999 (discussing
Democratic legislative opposition to nonpartisan elections across several sessions). See also
Traci Shurley, Hold the Politics: Would-Be Judges Peruse New Rules, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 2001 (discussing the first elections after Amendment 80).
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those in which participants remain disproportionately Democratic in their
primary preferences. For the 2006 primary, for instance, 277,220 votes were
cast in the Democratic primary for lieutenant governor; only 62,868 votes
were cast in the Republican primary for the same office. Thus, the over-
whelming majority of the 310,195 Arkansans who voted for an open state
supreme court position had voted in a Democratic primary only moments
earlier. This means that judicial candidates who are most at home in Demo-
cratic circles (judicial candidates may still appear at party meetings to seek
votes, for instance) and in making appeals to Democratic constituency
groups are going to remain advantaged in Arkansas for the foreseeable fu-
ture.
In addition to these partisan implications of the post-Amendment 80
judicial election system, the timing of judicial elections means that those
candidates who have to compete in a runoff election in November essential-
ly run an entirely separate second campaign six months following their first
evaluation by Arkansas voters. Moreover, their candidacies are considered
by an entirely different (and substantially larger) group of voters in Novem-
ber. In 2004, for instance, 291,888 voters cast votes in the first round, three-
person race for a position on the state supreme court. Six months later, the
top two finishers in the first round were considered by an electorate well
over twice as large (842,796 voters). In a circuit court race in 2006 almost
exactly twice as many voters voted in the November race as in the May pri-
mary. It is troubling indeed that the peculiarities of election turnout patterns
are nearly as important as the attributes of candidates and their campaigns in
shaping outcomes in post-Amendment 80 judicial politics in Arkansas.
B. Judicial Campaigns and Free Speech
Just as party is no longer present as an explicit cue for Arkansas voters
in judicial campaigns, also absent is a clear picture of the political and social
views and values that accompany the assorted candidates to the bench and
would inform their actions there. This is because the commentary supporting
Canon 5A of the official Code of Judicial Conduct states that a candidate for
judicial office shall not "make pledges or promises of conduct in office oth-
er than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or]
make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidates with re-
spect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court ....
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White2 -the broad 2002 United
States Supreme Court ruling deeming such rules as violations of candidates'
19. ARK. CODE OF JuDIcIAL CoNDuct 5A, cmt.
20. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
[Vol. 30
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARKANSAS
free speech rights-however, means that Arkansas's code will eventually be
modified. At present, the issue is under study. A follow-up 2005 decision by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in another Minnesota case further ex-
panded judges' free expression rights, overturning Minnesota's ban on
judges publicly stating their political party.2 This prohibition remains in the
Arkansas judicial canon. Although rules such as those struck down undoub-
tedly have served as an important and valuable assurance of perceived im-
partiality on the bench, as the majority opinion in the 2002 United States
Supreme Court case noted, they are somewhat contradictory to the rationale
for an elective judiciary.22
Even before the White decision, the canon had occasionally been ig-
nored. In 1984, for example, in two races for the Arkansas Supreme Court
the candidates who were trailing demanded that the frontrunners take stands
on such issues as pornography, school consolidation, and capital punish-
ment, and also challenged them to issue debates, and advertised their own
issue positions. In neither instance, however, were the frontrunners goaded
into discussing more than their qualifications for office or their views on
judicial reform. 23
Since the White ruling, some Arkansas judicial candidates have been
more willing to introduce issues into the debate during elections. During his
campaign for supreme court justice in 2004, Collins Kilgore touted his au-
thoring, as a circuit judge, of the landmark Lake View decision deeming
Arkansas's schools inadequate and inequitable. District Judge Roger Har-
rod, a candidate for the supreme court in 2006, publicly stated his disap-
proval of the supreme court's ruling in the Lake View case, which was still
pending at the time of his unsuccessful campaign against an incumbent jus-
tice. Although avoiding discussions about pending cases, Court of Appeals
Judge Wendell Griffen has become the most ardent advocates of judicial
speech during campaigns, writing recently that "honest speech by judges
and judicial candidates about disputed political and legal subjects which
does not concern pending or impending litigation and litigants is protected
by the First Amendment from prior restraint by the government."24 Griffen
21. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (2005).
22. See Austin Gelder, Ruling Imperils Gags on Judicial Candidates, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, July 1, 2002 (discussing the relationship between the 2002 ruling and the Arkansas
Code of Judicial Conduct).
23. See, e.g., Court Candidate Blasts Opponent for Refusal to Discuss Key Issues, ARK.
DEMOCRAT, June 12, 1984; Bob Sanders, Voters Must Know Views of Judicial Candidates,
ARK. GAZETTE, July 10, 1984; Stephen Buel, 'Philosopher' Johnson Vies with 'Reformer'
Holt for High Court, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Oct. 7, 1984; Stephen Buel, Johnson Challenges Holt
to Debate, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Oct. 21, 1984. See also Editorial, Judge Candidates, ARK.
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 15, 1985.




has come under fire for some of his public pronouncements as a sitting
judge, including comments made during his two campaigns for the supreme
court (in 2004 and 2006), and has faced investigations by the Arkansas Judi-
cial Discipline and Disability Commission.
Although these examples-particularly the disputes involving Grif-
fen-have received much attention, it is important to recognize the degree to
which the overwhelming majority of candidates for judge, particularly at the
trial court level, assiduously avoid any conversation about issues while on
the campaign trail. In doing so, they often specifically cite their respect for
the canon. Moreover, it is important to note that there has yet to be a race in
which more than one candidate has engaged in a lively discussion of issues
of the sort discussed by Griffen. Therefore, there has yet to be a true issue-
based "campaign" for judge in the state. The canon may ultimately be heavi-
ly edited, but the tradition of avoiding issues in judicial races in Arkansas
still has some time left in it, although it will inevitably erode when judicial
candidates begin to show success at the ballot box through the discussion of
substantive matters.
C. The Importance of Name Recognition
With party label now absent from ballots and debates on issues deemed
inappropriate by canon and tradition, on what basis does the electorate
choose between competing candidates? The factors that seemed most rele-
vant before Amendment 80 appear to maintain their status across recent
election cycles. One hypothesis is that "name recognition is all, and the can-
didate with a short, comfortable-sounding name, easily remembered, has a
decisive advantage." Certainly the historical rosters of supreme court justic-
es display an exceptional number of names such as Smith, Brown, and
Jones, and few names of more than two syllables. Robert A. Leflar, for ex-
ample, remained convinced that the more familiar, American-sounding
name of his 1942 opponent (R. W. Robins) was highly advantageous to the
latter. The short-name theory has no explanatory value, however, when all
candidates have equally succinct ones (for example, Hays or Brown; Purtle
or Harmon; Newbem, Bentley, or Sanders).26
Perhaps more important than a short name is a familiar name, especial-
ly one with judicial connotations. The name recognition value that comes
from previous office holding is clearly important for election to the general
25. Id.
26. Doug Smith, Supreme Court: Short Name Helps, ARK. GAZETrE, Oct. 26, 1977
(interviewing Leflar, who also acknowledged that Robins's chairmanship of the state Demo-
cratic party and lopsided margins in the machine counties were influential, as was the fact
that most of the young lawyers Leflar had recruited among his former students suddenly
abandoned the race to participate in World War II).
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jurisdiction bench: only sixteen of 105 circuit judges in office in 2003, for
whom such information was available, had never held previous public of-
fice. The remainder had been either a municipal or other type of judge, pros-
ecuting attorney, deputy prosecutor, city attorney, state representative, or
school board member, and many had served in several positions.
A prominent name can often assure victory to a judgeship without op-
position. When former Congressman Ray Thornton (who represented both
the Fourth and Second congressional districts at different points in time)
decided to seek an associate justice spot in 1996, he was unopposed. One
observer said, "We don't know how good a judge Ray Thornton will be, but
we do know he's Ray Thornton." Although no relation to the man who first
appointed her to office, the Clinton last name (her first married name) was
clearly beneficial to Judge Annabelle Clinton in her early races in the late
1980s. She has continued to prominently display that last name on the ballot
and on campaign materials, including an unopposed elevation to the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court in 1998 after becoming Annabelle Clinton Imber.
Interestingly, according to a survey of incumbent judges in 1985, over
one-fourth had a close relative who had served on the bench. Chief Justice
Jack Holt, Jr., elected in 1984, followed both an uncle and a cousin to the
supreme court bench. Family ties did not, however, assist the race of Griffin
Smith, Jr. (son of Chief Justice Griffin Smith, who served from 1937 to
1955) against an incumbent justice in 1988, nor Eugene Harris's attempt in
1980 to secure the chief justiceship that his father held from 1957 to 1969.
The unsuccessful Harris race challenges another generalization-that
an eye-catching nickname has strong voter appeal. Eugene ("Kayo") Harris
was not a winner, nor were Charles A. ("Charlie") Brown or W. H. ("Son-
ny") Dillahunty in 1980, nor Wilbur C. ("Dub") Bentley in 1984. Another
"Dub" (W.H. Arnold), however, won the chief justiceship in 1996.27
The familiar phenomenon of "friends and neighbors" is obviously in-
fluential in judicial races. Candidates in statewide races generally will re-
ceive the strongest support in their home counties or areas. Harris's major
strength came from his chancery district in 1980, for example, and John
Harmon's strength came from those counties where his father-in-law, a for-
mer state senator, had political influence. In the 1996 race for chief justice,
winner "Dub" Arnold ran up huge margins around his southwest Arkansas
home, including eighty-seven percent in his home county. Albeit by smaller
margins, his opponent found success in the counties around his Delta birth-
place and his northwest Arkansas residence. Familiarity, however, can also
breed displeasure: the Pulaski County prosecutor "Dub" Bentley got only
twenty-three percent of the Pulaski County vote in his supreme court bid in
27. Philip L. Dubois, The Significance of Voting Cues in State Supreme Court Elections,
13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 757 (Spring 1979) (advancing the "nickname" theory).
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1984. In the 2004 race for supreme court justice, a mirror of "friends and
neighbors" voting kicked in. Pulaski County Circuit Judge Collins Kilgore
touted his role in deciding the landmark Lake View school funding decision
in the May preferential primary. But in both that race and in the November
runoff, Kilgore was punished by voters in more rural enclaves where
schools had been threatened by consolidation as a result of the debate
prompted by that ruling.
D. The Influence of Interest Groups and Attorney Support
Generally, interest-group endorsements are most influential in less vis-
ible races. For instance, although organized labor has experienced its diffi-
culties in the electoral arena in the modem era, labor-endorsed candidates
for the supreme court have been much more successful than not in recent
decades, and at least one victory (John Purtle's in 1978 over Otis Turner,
who had the backing of the bar) has been largely attributed to labor's active
exertions. Labor's role has been even more important in general jurisdiction
judicial races. Perhaps for this reason, organized labor has staunchly sup-
ported the elective method. Through 2006, however, other interest groups
have yet to play the role that they have played in neighboring states of run-
ning independent advertising in judicial races, typically attack-oriented ma-
terial discussing matters not normally allowed by judicial canons. It seems
inevitable, however, that such election techniques will eventually enter the
airwaves of Arkansas.28
At present, the most consequential organized interest is assumed to be
the state's lawyers. The most frequently employed newspaper advertisement
in judicial races is the one featuring long lists of lawyers' names or signa-
tures endorsing the candidate-for example, "Over 100 Area Lawyers Sup-
port the Re-election of Charles Williams, Fayetteville Municipal Judge." On
the Sunday before an election, the statewide newspaper has page after page
of ads such as that run by Jack Holt, Jr., in 1984 which listed the names of
nearly seven hundred lawyers and bore a simple message: "Those of us who
are members of the legal community believe that there's only one candidate
who has the skills, determination, experience and temperament to be our
Chief Justice. 29
As was the case in decades past, candidates for statewide office begin
their campaigns by attempting to secure commitments of support and activi-
ty from lawyers in each county, hoping that they will spread the word to
28. Telephone Interview by Diane Blair with J. Bill Becker, President, Arkansas State
AFL-CIO (Sept. 30, 1985); Anthony Champagne, Address at the Symposium on Judicial
Campaign Conduct and The First Amendment: Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns (2002).
29. Williams advertisement in NORTHWEST ARK. TIMES, May 25, 1980; Holt advertise-
ment in ARK. GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 1984.
[Vol. 30
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARKANSAS
their clients and others with whom they have influence. Often they begin
communication with their cadre of classmates from law school, a communi-
cation system enhanced by the fact that Arkansas had only one law school
until 1975, when the Little Rock campus became a separate institution. Of
the present nineteen supreme court justices and court of appeals judges, only
three attended an out-of-state law school. Nearly nine in ten of the general
jurisdiction judges as of 2003 had a law degree from either the Fayetteville
(67.8%) or Little Rock (18.3%) law schools. Furthermore, according to a
mid-1980s survey, most (forty-three of fifty-nine) indicated that they were
very or moderately active in the state bar and even more (fifty-two of fif-
ty-nine) stated that they were active in local bar association activities prior
to their elections.3°
What has changed over the decades is the cost of seeking judicial of-
fice, which has ranged from $10,000 or $15,000 in a contested statewide
race in the 1940s, to at least $250,000 in the 1990s and 2000s (the record
was over $600,000 spent in a 1990 Supreme Court race). General jurisdic-
tion judges with contested elections increasingly spend six-figure sums in
their campaigns (the most expensive being in Little Rock-based districts
where television is now regularly used and races tend to be significantly
more costly in general). Here, perhaps, is where support from the legal
community is most consequential. With some exceptions, and excepting the
lawyer-candidates themselves who tend to fund large amounts of trial court
races, the most constant source of the money in judicial races comes from
other lawyers, and because large sums are necessary to run a competitive
race, judicial candidates who cannot get financial backing from the bar face
something of a silent veto. Here also may be the most disturbing aspect of
an elective judiciary. The sight during an election year of judicial candidates
scurrying from one law office to another in search of support and contribu-
tions inevitably diminishes the ideal image of a totally independent, unobli-
gated, and uncompromised judiciary.31
The judicial canons state, "A candidate shall not personally solicit or
accept campaign contributions."32 Nevertheless, there is no secrecy about
who has (and has not) contributed. Individual contributions must be re-
ported, and larger contributors are then identified in newspaper accounts.
30. Supreme Court Justice Biographies, http://courts.ar.us/supremecourt/index.cfn (last
visited Apr. 12, 2008). Schools of circuit court judges in office in 2003 found in 38 THE
ARKANSAS LAWYER 9(2003).
31. See James D. Gingerich and Warren Readnour, The 1990 Arkansas Judicial Elec-
tions: Much Ado About Nothing?, ARKANSAS LAWYER 37-41 (July 1992); Adam Weintraub,
Can Justice Remain Blind to Money?, ARK. GAZETTE, May 14, 1990; Adam Weintraub, Judi-
cial Race Cost Almost $160,000, ARK. GAZETTE, June 29, 1990 (discussing money's role in
Arkansas judicial races).
32. ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANON 5(C)(2).
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More importantly, judicial candidates quickly learn that their contributors
want to give their check directly to the candidate, not to some intermediary,
and even the most principled of candidates soon bends to this reality by ac-
companying a campaign aide who takes the check while the candidate
shakes the contributor's hand.
33
If, as most judges and lawyers assume, the bar's influence is the critical
factor in judicial elections, another question has been raised about the extent
to which judicial elections actually represent the voice of the people. This is
an especially intriguing question, because one of the major arguments
against an appointive judiciary is that it simply replaces the politics of the
electoral arena with the politics of the legal community. As a former circuit
judge noted, "There is nothing more political than appointments. The only
problem is that you're not talking politics that involves the people any more.
You're talking politics between the governor and a law firm."34
It should also be noted, however, that the actual influence of the legal
community may be less than is commonly assumed. Judicial elections are
held simultaneously with other contests, and usually ninety percent or more
of those voting for the top of the ticket express their preferences in judicial
contests as well. It is difficult to imagine that any sizable proportion of the
306,520 Arkansans who voted in the 2004 election for supreme court chief
justice have a lawyer, or sought a lawyer's guidance, before marking the
ballot. In the most thorough test to date of bar influence in judicial elections,
a survey of voters leaving the polls in a highly controversial election to the
Texas Supreme Court found that only 7.6% of those who had voted had
received information from an attorney.35 The survey also revealed that
85.8% of those leaving the polls could not remember the name of the judi-
cial candidate for whom they had just voted! Although this test has not been
replicated in Arkansas, one poll did indicate that less than one percent of
Arkansas voters could recognize the names of their supreme court justices.
One scholar of state judicial systems has noted, "As long as he remains
largely invisible to the public, his chances of remaining in office are excel-
lent., 36 If this is true, Arkansas judges should be invincible. When attorney
general Steve Clark appeared in his court to enter a plea on his felony theft
charges and to request that files be sealed to protect against prejudicial pub-
licity, the circuit judge noted: "I guess the court could say that in all the
33. Telephone Interview by Diane Blair with Associate Justice Robert Dudley, Arkansas
Supreme Court, (Sept. 20, 1985); Author's own experience as a campaign manager for a
general jurisdiction judicial candidate.
34. See, Bentley supra, note 9 (quoting Judge Hendricks).
35. See Charles A. Johnson, Roger C. Shaefer, & R. Neal McKnight, The Salience of
Judicial Elections, 59 SOCIAL SCIENCE QuARTERLY 371-78 (1978).
36. Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan, 32 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 509, 518 (1978).
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years he's been here, the fact that I've never had my picture taken before is
evidence that this case has generated significant publicity."
Perhaps because there is some doubt as to the decisive nature of bar
endorsements and support, candidates for judicial office use a wide variety
of campaign devices-billboards, yard signs, appearances before civic
groups, and newspaper, radio, and (increasingly) television advertise-
ments--containing an astonishing array of biographical information: that
they chopped cotton, coached Little League, taught Sunday School, belong
to a Masonic Lodge, organized a volunteer fire department, and married a
Tri Delt. One enterprising (and successful!) candidate for the supreme court
chiefjusticeship ran an advertisement proclaiming his endorsement by twen-
ty-seven ex-University of Arkansas Razorback football lettermen, complete
with the rampaging Razorback Hog logo. Because of the importance of a
name sticking in voters' minds long enough for them to cast their ballots,
recent election cycles have included bevies of memorable (for good or ill)
radio jingles.37
The effective cues to which a judicial electorate responds in Arkansas
remain something of a mystery. What is known, however, is that in an elec-
tive judicial system, those who reach the bench must ordinarily have some
political skills and some measure of name recognition in addition to whatev-
er legal skills they may possess. In the most thorough analysis of the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court to date, Cal Ledbetter, Jr., concluded, "Political activity
and influence rather than legal ability or success as a practitioner is the deci-
sive factor in helping one to reach the supreme court. 38
E. Appointive Methods: Elitist or Representative?
This is not to suggest that appointive methods inevitably produce a
more distinguished bench. In fact, some of the most exhaustive research on
this subject has concluded that "neither the method of selection nor the term
of office seems to correlate very highly or consistently with technical com-
petence, honesty, wisdom and other non-ideological virtues." Still, particu-
larly problematic because of the judiciary's role in protecting the rights of
minorities, it is clear that, in Arkansas at least, the elective method has not
yet produced a very "representative" judiciary. Through 2006, one woman
and no African Americans have been elected to a seat on the supreme court.
In contrast, the allegedly more "elitist" appointive method had placed two
women and five African Americans (including Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals appointee Lavenski Smith) on the supreme court to fill vacancies.
37. Judicial campaign circulars in author's possession; Razorback advertisement used by
Richard Adkisson in ARK. GAzETTE, June 9, 1980.
38. LEDBErrER, supra note 9, at 201 (1961).
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Since Amendment 80's adoption, a woman has been appointed to serve in
two different supreme court positions, and an African American man has
been appointed to the court of appeals. In addition, the first openly gay
judge in Arkansas was appointed to a district court position to fill a vacancy
in 2007.' 9
Although females and African Americans remain underrepresented at
the trial court level just as in the higher courts (and, until the dissolution of
the dual court system, had faced tremendous difficulty in gaining judgeships
focused on criminal matters), court rulings did open opportunities for mem-
bers of those groups. The new juvenile judgeships created after the state
supreme court declared the juvenile justice system unconstitutional provided
open-seat judgeships in an arena in which women lawyers were more likely
to have professional experience and to be perceived by voters as having
special competence. In 1990 alone there were eight women candidates
statewide for the newly created juvenile judgeships, and women candidates
continued to have success in winning these judgeships until they lost distinc-
tiveness after Amendment 80. More direct in its impact was a 1992 federal
district court order (typically referred to as the Hunt decree) under the feder-
al Voting Rights Act requiring the creation of judicial "subdistricts" within
existing general jurisdiction court districts, each of which contained an Afri-
can American voting age population of at least sixty percent. All told, a doz-
en judgeships were covered by the decree, immediately resulting in a sharp
increase in the number of African American jurists in the state.4" Identifiable
juvenile courts and the judicial sub-districts remain in place after Amend-
ment 80, so the benefits of the previous rulings to enhanced diversity on the
courts remain in place.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has highlighted, there have been some al-
terations to judicial politics in post-Amendment 80 Arkansas. Some of those
changes emanate directly out of the rule changes created by the amendment,
although others have been brought about through alterations to the environ-
ment that happened to have occurred in the same era (particularly the United
States Supreme Court's White decision and the further limitation on the
power of pre-election appointment to advantage candidates for open seats).
Still, although there have been changes at the margins, the dynamics remain
more similar than fundamentally different. Judicial elections in Arkansas are
39. STUART S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 39
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973).
40. Ronald Smothers, Arkansas Plan to Promote Election of Black Judges Brings a
Familiar Challenge, N. Y. TiMES, 8 Apr. 1996, at 10 (discussing the Hunt decree and later
failed efforts by white plaintiffs to overturn it).
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still the same game, albeit one with slightly altered rules. As a result, the
debate whether merit appointment or election is the better way to select
judges remains unchanged and ultimately becomes a normative discussion
with advocates on either side of the debate holding valid arguments.
Although critics of the elective system abound inside and outside of the
legal community, there seems little likelihood that the system will be
changed in the near future. Merit appointment (at least at the appellate level)
was widely discussed during the judicial reform process that culminated in
Amendment 80 but was ultimately rejected in the drafting of the measure. It
seems that nonpartisanship is the major step that will occur in the realm of
judicial selection in Arkansas for this generation.
One potential force that could promote a renewed discussion of the ap-
pointment system in the years ahead is the probability of increasingly ex-
pensive, brutal judicial elections as the twenty-first century progresses. Two
recent supreme court campaigns give some feel for what may well become
the norm, at least at the statewide level. In the determinative 1990 Demo-
cratic primary for an open seat on the court won by Robert Brown by just
over 1000 votes over Judith Rogers, the first woman elected to an Arkansas
appellate court, Arkansans experienced the most expensive and, arguably,
the most vicious contest in memory. Exceeding a half-million dollars (that
"drained" lawyers who provided much of those funds), the campaign was
marked by televised attacks and counter-attacks about ethics, lying, sexism,
absenteeism, facials and manicures, trips to the Soviet Union, and who had
and had not seen the porn film "Deep Throat." Six years later, the race for
chief justice race saw similar attack advertisements, this time focused on
whether one candidate had made personal use of a Datsun sports car seized
in a drug arrest when he was a prosecutor. It is possible that if campaigns as
vicious and as costly as those for the supreme court in 1990 and 1996 do
indeed become the norm-and if the demise of the judicial canons limiting
the topics about which judicial candidates may communicate with voters
begin to make judicial races indistinct from other legislative and executive
races-a new movement for merit-based appointments may arise in the Ar-
kansas legal community. Amendment 80 gives the legislature the explicit
power to send such a merit-based proposal to the people. The question re-
mains, however, whether the people of Arkansas, used to having the ulti-
mate control over their justice system, will ever choose to give up that pow-
er.
4 1
41. Interview by Diane Blair with David Malone, Senator, Arkansas General Assembly
(July 3, 1990) (discussing the bar's response to the persistent contribution requests during the
1990 campaign). Bar enthusiasm for an appointive process was tempered, however, by the
fact that the bar candidate, Robert Brown, succeeded in the race while the loser, Judge Judith
Rogers, would have likely been the appointee to the post by Governor Clinton.
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